Hype the virtual currency of Bangbai

1. Let's get in touch to find out

2. At present, all countries are in the research stage of virtual currency. blockchain is studied by large companies. Large companies have venture capital and will not go to ordinary people to invest. Therefore, the virtual currency and blockchain that ordinary people can invest in are fake.

3. You can just go to toobi. It's safe to go in and out of gold

4. There is no hardware floating-point computing capability, but STM32 is a hardware multiplication and division method. Multiplication takes only one clock, division is fast, and the efficiency of analog floating-point computing is not low. The key depends on the amount of computation. If it is a multiplication and division intensive application, such as FFT, there is no problem, almost close to the level of fixed-point DPS

5. Task help can make money by doing task help, but now it's a simulated transaction. Only cash coupons are sent. Cash coupons can be used when releasing tasks. We can make money when we make a real deal in the future. For example, someone needs to move, unlock, punch holes, make statements, etc. you can make other people's money by helping others, so that your efforts can be rewarded, and other people's needs can be valued

6. China is a developing country in the period of system transformation; However, on the choice of monetary policy framework under the open conditions, we can draw some useful enlightenment from the experience of the three countries: in terms of the ultimate goal of monetary policy, the people's Bank of China law 6 promulgated in 1995 stipulates that the goal of China's monetary policy is to maintain the stability of currency value and promote economic growth; In fact, China's monetary policy is facing multi-objective constraints from the Central Government: price stability! Promote employment! Ensure economic growth! Support the reform of state-owned enterprises! Expand domestic demand with active fiscal policy! To ensure that foreign exchange reserves do not decrease! Keep RMB exchange rate stable (Gong fangle! Ying Yixun, 2000; Xie Ping, 2000) & quot; Therefore, in this sense, China's monetary policy should learn from the experience of developed countries, adhere to the single goal of stabilizing prices, graally weaken or even eliminate the multi-objective constraints; After the final goal of monetary policy is determined, the choice of monetary policy framework actually comes down to the choice of intermediate target of monetary policy; Since 1996, China has taken money supply as the intermediate target of monetary policy; In recent years, some scholars believe that the growth rates of M1 and M2 deviate greatly from the predetermined control target, and the money supply target is no longer effective. We should abandon the money supply target and establish a monetary policy framework with inflation rate as the control target; The author thinks that from the practice of the United States, Britain and Germany, the choice of monetary policy framework is not invariable, but should be adjusted according to the actual economic and financial conditions of their own country; According to the current economic and financial situation in China, there are some difficulties in the implementation of inflation targeting Law: (1) China is currently implementing a managed floating exchange rate system, and the inflation targeting law requires the exchange rate to float freely, because there are sometimes contradictions between the exchange rate target and the inflation target; It will take time for RMB to be fully convertible 2) One of the preconditions of adopting the inflation target method is that the central bank has a strong ability to control the inflation target, can comprehensively observe a variety of indicators, use a variety of monetary policy tools, fully understand the transmission channels of monetary policy, and has the technology and ability to predict inflation; At present, China's central bank lacks effective means to control inflation 3) In terms of the independence of the central bank, according to the relevant provisions of the people's Bank of China Law and the actual process of the current economic and financial system reform, it is still difficult to achieve the independence of the central bank required by the inflation target law 4) In terms of transparency of monetary policy and credibility of central bank, we need to further improve compared with countries that implement inflation targeting law; It can be seen that China's current transition to the inflation target law does not have the conditions; Our current task is to learn from the successful experience of western developed countries to further improve the monetary policy framework with money supply as the intermediary target. We should mainly start from the following aspects: 1. As China's financial innovation is speeding up, money supply as the intermediary target of monetary policy does face some problems pointed out by some scholars, such as measurability! The correlation with the ultimate goal and so on; We should constantly revise this index, reasonably define the level and statistical scope of money supply, so as to ensure its measurability and enhance its relevance with the ultimate goal; At the same time, we should learn from the practice of the United States, Britain and Germany, monitor more information variables, establish the corresponding economic model, improve the data analysis and processing ability, and finally form a set including money supply! Interest rate! Exchange rate! Monetary policy monitoring index system including expected inflation rate and other indicators & quot
2. Accelerate the pace of interest rate marketization; China is still a country dominated by regulated interest rates. Most of the interest rates, including deposit and loan rates, are determined by the central bank, and the degree of interest rate marketization is not high; In the United States, Britain, Germany and other countries, interest rate is an important monetary policy tool; Therefore, China should actively carry out the reform of interest rate management system, speed up the pace of interest rate marketization, and improve the indirect control ability of the central bank
3. The importance of monetary policy transparency and central bank reputation in the United States, Britain and Germany is also worth learning; In recent years, China's central bank has done a lot of work in increasing the transparency of monetary policy, such as regularly publishing money supply targets, compiling 5 monetary policy reports, 6 clarifying the implementation of monetary policy, and reporting monthly! Quarterly! Financial data are published in the form of annual report; However, we should learn from the experience of these countries to further improve the transparency of monetary policy, such as increasing the transparency of monetary policy decision-making process, enhancing the authority of the central bank to guide the public and the market, cultivating rational market expectations, and enhancing the credibility of the central bank; Of course, in the long run, China has joined the WTO, in the economy! Under the background of financial globalization, China's monetary policy will face the development of financial deepening and financial innovation! International capital flow, especially short-term capital flow, should be strengthened! Arbitrage and speculation of interest rate and exchange rate, etc. these changes have had a strong impact on the monetary policy of western developed countries in history (especially since the 1980s), and forced most countries to abandon the monetary target law; At that time, how to choose China's monetary policy framework is to learn from the practice of the United States and not clearly announce the nominal target for beneficial exploration, or to learn from the practice of the United Kingdom and directly adopt the inflation targeting method;

7. China's foreign exchange reserves and inflation
Abstract: in recent years, the scale of China's foreign exchange reserves has grown rapidly, reaching 941.1 billion US dollars by June 2006, surpassing China and becoming the country with the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. So does the increase of foreign exchange reserves have an impact on China's price index and how much? Based on the theory of inflation transmission mechanism of international monetarism, this paper uses cointegration analysis and Granger causality analysis to analyze the causality and long-term equilibrium between price level and foreign exchange reserves. Based on the empirical results, this paper draws conclusions and analyzes the results
key words: foreign exchange reserves; inflation; Foreign exchange account; Base currency; Cointegration analysis
since the reform and opening up, China's degree of opening up has been continuously improving, foreign trade has been in surplus for many years, and foreign exchange reserves have increased year by year. In 1996, it was only US $105 billion. At the end of 2001, China's foreign exchange reserves exceeded the US $200 billion mark, reaching US $286.4 billion by the end of 2001, and rapidly soared to US $403.3 billion by the end of 2003, Become the world's second largest holder of foreign exchange reserves after China. At the end of 2005, foreign exchange reserves reached a new high of 818.8 billion US dollars. As of June 2006, China's foreign exchange reserves reached 941.1 billion US dollars, which has surpassed China and become the country with the largest foreign exchange reserves in the world. The increase of foreign exchange reserves has a positive effect on enhancing the country's comprehensive national strength and external payment capacity. But at the same time, the price index has been rising since 2002. After entering the first quarter of 2004, China's State price index showed an upward trend, and the pressure of inflation became increasingly apparent. In 2005, the price index fell again. In the first quarter of 2006, the price index graally recovered, and continued to maintain the trend of low inflation. Then, does the growth of foreign exchange reserves have an impact on China's price fluctuation, what kind of impact, how to affect it, and what factors restrict it? This paper takes the data from 1981 to 2004 as the statistical sample, takes the inflation transmission mechanism of international monetarism as the theoretical basis, and applies cointegration analysis and Granger causality analysis to analyze the causality and long-term equilibrium between inflation and foreign exchange reserves< From the perspective of empirical analysis, the international quantity theory of western economics finds that there is a close relationship between world inflation and the level of international reserves. It holds that the excessive growth of the world's powerful currencies in the 1930s is largely e to the excessive growth of international reserves, The latter leads to global inflation< They inherited Hume's idea of money price adjustment mechanism, and emphasized that world inflation comes from the excessive growth of the world's total amount of money, and the balance of payments and foreign exchange reserves are the transmission mechanism of price rise. Therefore, this theory is also referred to as "international monetarism". According to the idea of international monetarism, the transmission mechanism of a country's inflation is: a country's balance of payments surplus will lead to the increase of its foreign exchange reserves, and directly increase the total amount of money supply through the role of money multiplier, so that the total social demand will increase. In the absence of idle resources in the country, the total social supply can not be increased correspondingly, and the supply and demand of the commodity market can only be balanced through the rise of prices. In the capital market, the increase of money supply will rece the interest rate. Rising prices will weaken the competitiveness of export commodities, rece the current account surplus or increase the deficit. Falling interest rates will increase the capital outflow, rece the capital and financial account surplus or increase the deficit, thus recing the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves. The rection of foreign exchange reserves will have the opposite effect
foreign exchange reserves and economic operation fluctuate and adjust in this negative feedback, and achieve equilibrium in the dynamic. This relationship can be expressed as follows:
balance of payments surplus → foreign exchange reserves ↑ → base money ↑ → money supply ↑ → price rise ↑, interest rate drop ↓ → current account and capital and financial account make foreign exchange reserves fall ↓ → money supply ↓ → price fall ↓, interest rate rise ↑ → current account and capital and financial account make foreign exchange reserves rise, So it goes back and forth
this is the theoretical basis for this paper to study the quantitative relationship between foreign exchange reserves and price index. The basic theory of monetary school is: (where MS is money supply and MD is money demand)
Ms = MD
money demand is a first-order homogeneous function. Let MD be money demand, p be domestic price level, y denote national income, I denote interest rate. The money demand function can be abbreviated as:
MD = PXF (y, I)
let d be domestic money supply base, That is, the domestic credit of the central bank or the domestic assets supporting the money supply; R is the money supply base from abroad, which is obtained through the balance of payments surplus, represented by the international reserves: m is the money multiplier, which refers to the coefficient that the banking system creates money through rolling deposits and loans and multiplies the money supply base. Then the money supply function can be expressed as
Ms = M ×( D R)
so there are: P × f／(Y，i)=m ×( D R)
then:
P = f (D, R, y, I)
from the above equation, we can see that the price level is a function of domestic credit, foreign exchange reserves, national income and interest rate; The transmission of foreign exchange reserves is one of the factors of price rise.

8. The establishment of monetary standard system and the economic development of various countries after World War II have made monetary policy more and more important. Accordingly, the issue of central bank independence has also aroused widespread debate. Because the practice of economic development in various countries shows that whether the central bank can effectively formulate and implement monetary policy and maintain monetary implicitness largely depends on the independence of the central bank< First, the meaning and measurement standard of the independence of the central bank
the issue of the independence of the central bank was originally proposed to make it relatively separate from commercial banks, not for profit, but focus on the business of the central bank. However, with the strengthening of the state's influence and intervention on the central bank, the central bank has increasingly become a tool of the government, and the government often sacrifices monetary policy for political needs. In short, the independence of the central bank refers to the extent to which the central bank is subject to other legal subjects (mainly the government) in performing its functions
there are different ways to measure the independence of the central bank. On the whole, there are several standards to measure the independence of the central bank: (1) the independence of organization and personnel mainly depends on whether the central bank is subordinate to the government and the government's control over the appointment and removal proceres of the central bank's senior decision-makers and managers 2) The standard of functional independence mainly depends on whether the central bank can formulate and implement monetary policy independently, how to solve the conflict between monetary policy and fiscal policy, and whether it has the compulsory obligation to finance the government deficit 3) The standard of economic independence mainly depends on whether the central bank has independent financial resources and whether it depends on financial allocation. It should be pointed out that since the 1990s, in a series of reports and articles, the world bank has quantified the factors that affect the independence of the central bank to explain the level of independence< Second, the legislative comparison of different countries
stipulating the legal status of the central bank from the perspective of legislation is an important factor determining the independence of the central bank. Countries in the world have made different provisions on the independence of the central bank according to their own historical and cultural traditions, values, political system, economic level and other factors< In the United States, the Federal Reserve Board is directly responsible to the Congress. In general, no one or department has the right to intervene in the decision-making and implementation of the Federal Reserve's monetary policy, except that the Congress authorizes the president of the United States to issue instructions in indivial periods. According to the needs of economic regulation, the Federal Reserve independently controls and controls the money supply, independently sets deposit reserve rate and discount rate, independently decides the quantity, type and price of securities bought and sold in the open market, and is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy. Since the establishment of the Federal Reserve, finance is also completely independent of finance, and there is no obligation to support government financing for a long time. The chairman of the Federal Reserve is appointed by the president, but the term of office of the chairman and the term of office of the president are mutually staggered. Such a president can not appoint the chairman of the Federal Reserve at the beginning just like other cabinet members, so as to ensure that the monetary policy of the Federal reserve is not controlled by the president in terms of personnel< According to the Federal Bank Law of Germany, the federal bank regulates the amount of money in circulation and the amount of credit provided to economic departments for the purpose of stabilizing money. It has the right to formulate and implement monetary policies independently and make decisions on discount, credit, open market business and minimum reserve requirements without government constraints, The federal bank has the power to issue money alone, and the government cannot make up the deficit by printing money. The president and vice president are nominated by the government and appointed by the president, but the government must seek the advice of the federal bank Council when nominating
3. All activities of the Bank of Japan should be carried out under the leadership and supervision of the Ministry of Tibet. The Minister of Tibet has the power to command the general business of the Bank of Japan, to supervise and to dismiss officials. Formally, the Bank of Japan's major decisions are made through the policy committee, the highest decision-making body of the Bank of Japan, including the formulation of monetary policy and the choice of policy tools. But in fact, the adjustment of deposit reserve ratio by the committee must be approved by the Minister of Tibet; When the maximum interest rate is revised, it can only be implemented after consulting the "interest rate adjustment review meeting", so it has less independence. After the adoption of the amendment to the Bank of Japan law in April 1997, its independence has been enhanced, giving the Bank of Japan the power to independently formulate and implement monetary policy, to choose policy tools and to decide what form to take to achieve the goal of monetary policy
4. The Bank of Italy is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of finance. The representative of the Ministry of finance can attend the meeting of the board of directors of the bank, and has the right to suspend the implementation of the resolution if he thinks that the resolution of the meeting is inconsistent with the law. The president and directors of Bank of Italy are elected by the general meeting of shareholders and approved by the president. In formulating and implementing monetary policy, only the Minister of finance has the right to change the reserve rate of bank deposits, and the Ministry of finance also decides the issue of treasury bonds and the issue interest rate. The Bank of Italy is obliged to provide the Ministry of Finance with an overdraft loan of 14% of the budget expenditure of the current year, sometimes more than that< In accordance with the law of the people's Bank of China (hereinafter referred to as the law of the people's Bank of China), the people's Bank of China, under the leadership of the State Council, formulates and implements monetary policies and supervises the financial instry. Therefore, compared with the State Council, the people's Bank of China only has the decision-making power on general monetary policy matters, while decisions on annual money supply, interest rate, exchange rate and other important matters stipulated by the State Council should be submitted to the State Council for approval before implementation. The president of the people's Bank of China is nominated by the premier of the State Council and decided by the National People's Congress; The vice presidents are appointed or removed by the prime minister. The people's Bank of China may not overdraw the government, nor directly subscribe for or underwrite treasury bonds or other government bonds
we can't simply evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of the above-mentioned legislations, but the following points are indisputable: (1) the independence of the central bank is only a relative concept. The central bank can't be completely independent of the government, and it can't be free from the influence of the government. Even in Germany, which is recognized as the most independent central bank, Article 13 of the Federal Bank Act also stipulates that, The federal bank is obliged to advise the federal government on major issues of monetary policy and to provide relevant information on the needs of the government. In the United States, the Federal Reserve can only work within the basic framework of the government's established economic policies and objectives, which further illustrates this point 2) The independence of the central bank is not unchangeable, it is always in constant development and change, and the trend of development is constantly enhanced, such as the adoption of the people's Bank Law in 1995, the amendment of the bank law of Japan in 1997, and the establishment of the European Central Bank System (the European central bank is based on the German Federal Bank as a model), Its independence is even worse Note: Chen Xiao: Research on the legal system of the central bank, Law Press, 1997.) 3) The improvement of the independence of the central bank does not necessarily mean a more stable financial environment, but the improvement of the independence of the central bank is more concive to its objective formulation and implementation of monetary policy, strengthening its control over inflation, and preventing the tendency of fiscal deficit monetization. According to empirical research, the more independent the central bank is, the lower the inflation rate is; The weaker the independence, the higher the inflation rate. For example, Italy's inflation index has been high, about 13%, while Germany's inflation index has always been very low, about 4% Note: Mao Yanbin, independence of the central bank and inflation, exploration of economic problems, No.8, 1995 4) From the comparison of the people's Bank of China with the Federal Bank of Germany and the Federal Reserve System of the United States, we can see that the people's Bank of China is only similar to them in terms of economic independence standards, but far from them in terms of more important organizational and personnel independence standards and functional independence standards; The government and financial departments intervene the central bank obviously from the specific economic work, and the functions of the central bank can not be fully exercised; Although there are legal provisions on the independence of the central bank, some provisions are not specific, the relationship is not clear and can not be seriously implemented. Therefore, we should strengthen the independence of the people's Bank of China as soon as possible, so that it can exercise its functions and powers with a detached attitude and an objective and fair position, and stabilize the financial environment< (1) change the administrative subordination of the people's Bank of China to the State Council, make it directly responsible to the National People's Congress, and correspondingly strengthen the autonomy of the people's Bank of China in formulating and implementing monetary policies, The power of monetary policy and the financial power owned by the government conflict with each other, and this conflict is fundamental, just like the conflict among legislation, administration and judicature, it is against the basic rules of law to transfer the two conflicting powers to the same institution. Moreover, the monetary policy with the main purpose of stabilizing the value of the currency should be neutral and sustainable, so it must be exercised by an independent institution Note: Lu Zefeng: financial innovation and legal reform, Law Press, 2000.)< For a long time, the local protectionism of the local government makes it difficult for the people's Bank of China to carry out its work. Once the people's Bank of China's behavior touches local interests, the local government often carries out administrative intervention. In the past two years, the people's Bank of China has adjusted the establishment of its branches according to the economic divisions and abolished its provincial branches. This major move has had a positive impact on weakening local intervention. However, e to the administrative subordination of the central bank to the State Council, it is impossible for the central bank to veto the decision of the State Council. For example, Article 29 of the people's Bank Law stipulates that the people's Bank of China has the obligation to perform the decision made by the State Council to finance specific non bank financial institutions. In this way, the central bank, which was originally cut off, is subject to the ties between local governments and government departments, and may be connected in disguised form through the State Council< Some scholars believe that the conditions for the people's Bank of China to be independent of the State Council are not yet mature, but "from the actual situation of our country, the central bank has a great technological monopoly in monetary policy decision-making, mainly because of its advantages in information, that is, the decision-making plan submitted by the central bank is often the only alternative, or the choice is very small, which makes it difficult to negate in terms of technology, Decisions tend to be in line with the central bank's intentions. " Note: Xie Ping: the choice of China's financial system, Shanghai Far East publishing house, 1996.) Dr. Xie Ping's words tell us that the people's Bank of China has the de facto independent decision-making power. In this case, why not give the central bank independent legal status
4. As mentioned above, the independence of the central bank is a relative concept at present, so changing the administrative subordination between the central bank and the State Council does not mean that it is not affected by the State Council. In practice, the people's Bank of China should respect and cooperate with the State Council. The State Council should be a solid guarantee for the people's Bank of China to exercise its functions and powers. The people's Bank of China has the obligation to coordinate its economic policies with the State Council and support the government's economic policies on the premise of stable currency